Truth and the Semantics of 'is true'
This is a paper on the semantics of the English truth predicate. I argue that 'is true' is more semantically complex than typical theories of truth allow, and that this has consequence for the metaphysics of truth—namely, this provides reasons to think that metaphysical deflationism about truth is false.
Truth and the Expressive Needs of Semantics
This is a follow-up to my paper "Deflating the Determination Argument." There I briefly sketched a way for deflationists to make sense of truth-conditions. In this paper, I argue that understanding truth-conditions in this deflationary way does not compromise the explanatory power of truth-conditional semantics. So deflationism really is compatible with truth-conditional semantic theories.
There are No Generics
In this note, I argue against the assumption that there is a distinct semantically interesting class of sentences picked out by the technical term 'generics.' I provide arguments that the bare plural has no distinctive generic reading, nor that there will be any unified analysis of the bare plural. If I am right, all extant theories of generics rest on a mistake.