Deflating the Determination Argument
Thought 6(3): 167-177
This paper argues for the compatibility of deflationism and truth-conditional semantic theories. I begin by focusing on an argument due to Dorit Bar-On, Claire Horisk, and William Lycan for incompatibility, arguing that their argument relies on an ambiguity between two senses of the expression ‘is at least.’ I go on to show how the disambiguated arguments have different consequences for the deflationist, and argue that no conclusions are established that the deflationist cannot accommodate. I then respond to some objections and gesture at a more general defense of the compatibility claim.
A Neglected QUA Solution to the Fundamental Problem of Christology (w/Jc Beall)
Forthcoming in Journal of Analytic Theology
We advance a novel solution, related to standard qua-solutions, to the fundamental problem of Christology—the problem that Christ's two natures apparently entail Christ have logically complementary properties. Our chief aim is to put the view on the theological table. We present the new view and argue that it is just as viable as other qua-solutions to the problem.